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December 19, 2006Comparing Microsoft infrastructure security with Open Source softwareRecently Nick over at WiKID Systems blogged about How to get Microsoft-esque security with open-source software. Now, to be fair WiKID is an open source company and has an interest in such a post, and has plenty of experience behind it. However, I had to comment because I feel it just wasn't a fair comparison, especially when considering two factor authentication in small business environments that leverage Windows environments like SBS 2003. I am posting the comment here, for many of my readers that don't visit Nick's blog. Posted by SilverStr at December 19, 2006 04:23 PM | TrackBack Comments
Dana: Way to call me out! And I'm glad to hear you are a regular reader. As you probably have inferred from previous posts, I definitely prefer to toss out a half-baked idea for discussion rather than wait for the souffle to rise. Primarily, because I am one slow thinker. In this case, while I didn't use the words TCO, I used the phrase "what is a poor company to do?". Perhaps I should have said, "what should a company using linux do?". What really struck me (and made it easy) was that I had already tested all the technologies listed. I could have done additional homework and testing to find something more equivalent than Squirrelmail, e.g. Not sure I follow this: "You still need a SEPERATE 2FA server if you want to leverage your Windows network. Instead... why doesn't WiKID build agents for those Windows networks?" Why not use ISA and Radius? Yes, you have a separate server, but it certainly doesn't need to be a big one. Perhaps we need a post on how to set up a MS-esque security infrastructure using SBS as a basis? Nick sorry, that cross post url should be: Hey Nick, I will respond to this on your blog as well... You can indeed use ISA with RADIUS to meet perimeter authentication needs. My point about the second SAS is the fact that if you want to use a logon graphical identification and authentication (GINA) module, you would have to purchase a different solution. That same GINA will work across all workstations and terminal servers, and can offer desktop level logon protection as required. When controlling a trust boundary (in this case an untrusted remote client accessing the trusted desktop via RDP) it makes sense to force 2FA at that choke point... aka the desktop logon. Although you could (and should) control session access at the firewall, infosec best practices dictates that you should also do it there. You might be right that we need a post about deploying SBS. Since the premium version of SBS COMES with ISA for free... there is a lot the server has to offer. Maybe over the holidays I will have some time to do just that. Can't make any promises though. Keep up the good work. And Happy Holidays. Posted by: Dana Epp at December 20, 2006 09:46 AM |
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My 5 Favorite Books
Writing Secure Code
Secure Programming Cookbook Security Engineering Secure Coding Principles & Practice Inside the Security Mind ![]()
My 5 Favorite Papers
Smashing the Stack
Penetration Studies Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted Systems DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria NSA Security Recommendation Guides ![]()
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