![]() |
![]() |
|
April 05, 2005Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?Melisa Bleasdale has written an article on the insecurities of applications, asking who is at fault. We've thrown millions of dollars at the corporate network in the name of security. We've implemented firewalls and gateways and access control. We've installed IDS, IPS, tokens and biometrics. But despite our best efforts, we're still under attack. Though it's really not surprising, we've overlooked the obvious. The obvious that she refers to? Applications on the host. Included in the article are different view points on who should be responsible, and what should ultimately happen. I think this is a debate that will go on for years yet. Secure software engineering as a discipline is still in its infancy, and very few software firms are using it as part of their software development lifecycle. It will take time before vendors would adopt such things... unless the consumer DEMANDS it. Sort of like what they did to Microsoft. Time will tell. I do hope if you are a reader here and are part of an ISV, that you are applying secure software engineering best practices in your software development lifecycle. If you don't, spend some time going through many of my posts in the last 2 years. You will start to see why its important. Posted by SilverStr at April 5, 2005 02:54 PM | TrackBackComments
A thought I had reading this, not sure if it's related or not, would be just how responsible should the developers be. IE: If I were to write a windows app, coding it all with my best practices, and then decide to do the help in HTML. For my help window I use the microsoft HTML widget, embedding IE into my app. Somehow a security problem in the html renderer allows the system to get rooted. How proactive do you have to be in a case like this? Should I have written my own HTML widget? Or only display a plain text file? Or should I hold the maker of the widget at fault? If I shouldn't rely on others programs or libraries, how low should I go? Should I be writing everything from the ground up in ASM, or should I rely completely on the libraries I use, assuming they are perfect and secure? Posted by: Arcterex at April 5, 2005 04:33 PMI think that we are all responsible, from the couple of guys who decide to create a program to do such and such, to the users who aquire the program some time later. And add to that the police (using the word in its broadest sense) who track down and prosecute the bad guys attacking our computers and networks. We all must be vigilant in security matters, That includes educating ourselves and keeping up on the latest threats and appropriate actions that each of us can take to protect ourselves. Posted by: Tom Brandt at April 5, 2005 06:11 PMHi, I am still looking for right click taskbar options removal, as well as others I have not got to yet. I have read on many sites that there are tons of entries for this section of the registry. Is there a site or book that may have a detailed list. Thanks, The problem is more basic than that. The computer is just a tool, and can be misused as such. Rookits are a good example. They are not programming flaws, but an extension of the OS. Behavioral analysis IPS systems are exactly what we need. It's like police for your network. Police are not perfect, neither are IPS systems, but it allow us to detect, investigate, and block irregular behavior. While it is true that we need to make are tools safe, we also have to recognize that people will disuse those tools. I believe the focus needs to be on improving accountability, so that it’s not such a faceless world out there. Posted by: Xavier Ashe at April 5, 2005 07:56 PMYes, application insecurity is one of the big ones. While I agree with the folks who say customers should be demanding more security, I see that basically they can say 'make it more secure' and that's about it. If they had the expertise and time to draw up a large list of coding practices (and tests to assure those practices were adhered to!), they'd be halfway to coding the product themselves! So in the end, they're sort of stuck with whatever the vendor told them about security. Because once you've invested in and rolled out a product, it's cheaper to work around security flaws (via firewall, IDS, etc) than to replace the software your business now depends on. And yeah - coders code to whatever spec they're given. Few PM's are going to say "It meets spec - now spend a few more days on it!" So I agree it's everyone's problem (and hence, everyone needs to do something about it), but there are two groups that need to start pulling more of the weight: _sales_ and _management_ for the software vendors. Sales teams need to start articulating that they actually /can/ sell security, but it's a long haul. A couple of product revs out, they'll be able to start comparing their security to competitors. And they can take a page from MS, who have been lifting thier security cred somewhat by evangelizing their SDL & commitment to security. Note that I'm not talking about the sales guys who work for eEye, or Foundstone, or similar security vendors. I'm talking about the ones who sell line-of-business software: CRM systems, databases, etc. Management needs to hear this, and start pushing for the design and process changes that will make software more secure. As my wife says "Security is designed in - vulnerabilties aren't patched out!" Posted by: Bryan at April 6, 2005 02:26 AMvery nice and informal comments. i just surfed in this great place. you do a great job, well done. Posted by: Jan at April 11, 2005 08:36 AM |
![]() ![]()
My 5 Favorite Books
Writing Secure Code
Secure Programming Cookbook Security Engineering Secure Coding Principles & Practice Inside the Security Mind ![]()
My 5 Favorite Papers
Smashing the Stack
Penetration Studies Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted Systems DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria NSA Security Recommendation Guides ![]()
Archives
December 2005
November 2005 October 2005 September 2005 August 2005 July 2005 June 2005 May 2005 April 2005 March 2005 February 2005 January 2005 December 2004 November 2004 October 2004 September 2004 August 2004 July 2004 June 2004 May 2004 April 2004 March 2004 February 2004 January 2004 December 2003 November 2003 October 2003 September 2003 August 2003 July 2003 June 2003 May 2003 April 2003 March 2003 February 2003 January 2003 December 2002 November 2002 October 2002 September 2002 August 2002 July 2002 ![]() |
|