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December 29, 2003The Eight Rules of SecurityRecently I have found myself with the opportunity to continue my ambassadorial role as it comes to information security, and provide some teaching on the basics of security as it relates to business. As I sit here and reflect on just what should be covered in a span of 15 minutes to give the most in depth understanding, I realize that its not such a simple task. Traditionally, people look at the infosec field as something to do about firewalls and antivirus. They treat technology as THE solution, instead of simply the enabler. And it’s this fallacy that weakens any security implementation. Security is a process, not a product… and should be treated as such. Through the security lifecycle, policy and procedure needs to take precedence over implementation. It’s a bigger part of the circle for a reason. Anyways, as I think about it more I realize that there are eight components of any good security decision. This isn’t new, and has been covered off in writings from people like Kevin Day years ago. And it still applies today. What it comes down to is eight simple rules (commandments so to speak) of information security.
With these eight rules, you will be significantly more secure. Technology will fail. Accept it. With proper policies and procedures in place though, you significantly reduce the impact that it may have on your organization. You will find that riddled through each of the above rules, a common theme exists.... if you only followed one rule, let it be The Rule of Least Privilege. Using least privilege significantly reduces the damage that may be caused when exposed to risk. It contains suspect behaviour to the smallest set of actions and activities, and maintains the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the rest of the environment. And in the end... thats what we want to accomplish. Posted by SilverStr at December 29, 2003 10:59 AM | TrackBack Comments
Very well-stated and well-written discussion of implementing security. In general though, all of these "rules for security" you hear bandied about sound like the rule for success in catching fish: throw the line where the fish are biting. Trying to implement all of these rules effectively requires a thorough underlying knowledge of the systems involved - which all too often is missing, especially by the managers making such decisions. It is this system understanding of what is always going on that is of most value for ensuring security; too often security rules are imposed without such knowledge under the mistaken belief that they alone are sufficient. Posted by: Marc at January 13, 2004 08:29 AMTechnical systems are enablers. Processes are enablers as well. People are enablers! People, processes and systems: in security, all of those are enablers for managing the goal of managing information risk. We can simplify the statement of the article to the basics: no measure can be more important than the other purely based on ´company resource category´. All possible technical, procedural and organisational measures ought to be compared together and in an ´objective´ way. The difficulty of this comparison are the strong linkages between the three categories, each of which are often managed by different groups and specialisms in an organisation. Additionally, to be really effective, the measures have to be aligned with what plays at the tactical and strategic political levels. I don´t think managers have to have technical knowledge. And I don´t think that system engineers have to implement processes. However I do think that everyone involved has to understand that his/her specialism is only a part of the whole and he/she should always try to work in a multidisciplinary way. But isn´t that the challenge of every modern organisation? Cool gsm pictures! Posted by: Twix at February 14, 2004 07:10 PM |
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Writing Secure Code
Secure Programming Cookbook Security Engineering Secure Coding Principles & Practice Inside the Security Mind ![]()
My 5 Favorite Papers
Smashing the Stack
Penetration Studies Covert Channel Analysis of Trusted Systems DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria NSA Security Recommendation Guides ![]()
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